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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 5159

vs.

ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al.
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO.
Def~endant

and Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a judgment of foreclosure entered
by the trial court in three cases which were, by stipulation
of all parties to the actions, consolidated for trial. The
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actions were filed by respondent, Utah Savings & Loan
Association against Robert B. Mecham and others, one
case No. 20591 is for the foreclosure of six separate mortgages executed by Robert B. Mecham and Ruth W. Mecham,
his wife, on six separate properties in Utah County, in an
area referred to and designated as the Schauerhamer area.
The Schauerhamer area is not a plotted subdivision property
( R.13 7) . There has been building of residences by Robert
B. Mecham on twelve separate tracts in this area each designated by metes and bounds descriptions. However foreclosure of mortgages is sought by respondent on but six of the
twelve lots, which lots are the only ones affected by the
savings and loan company's mortgages. The complaint for
foreclosure of the six mortgages states six separate causes
of action. The mortgages being foreclosed in the first five
causes of action were recorded December 13th, 1956.
(R. 141) The mortgage described in the sixth cause of
action was recorded June 26th, 1957. $3,000 of the mortgage money was advanced on each mortgage by respondent,
Utah Savings & Loan Association before any work had been
done on the properties in the Schauerhamer area. (R. 141)
Another case so consolidated is Civil No. 20,592 in
which respondent seeks to foreclose four mortgages purport·
edly executed by Robert B. Mecham and his wife. The
complaint states four separate causes of action. This area
is referred to and designated as the Rowley area, it also is not
a plotted subdivision but each mortgage describes a tract by
metes and bounds. Mecham constructed a house on each
one of these four tracts. Each of the mortgages affected by
this action were recorded on January 31st, 1957.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
The third case so consolidated is Civil No. 20,575 in
which respondent, seeks to foreclose twenty-four mortgages
on twenty-four separate tracts. Each of these mortgages are
purportedly executed by Robert B. Mecham and his wife.
The complaint in this case states twenty-four separate causes
of action. This area is referred to and designated as the
La\ Iesa area. This area was not a plotted subdivision at the
time of the recording of the mortgages (R. 138) and therefore each tract described in each mortgage is by a metes and
bounds description. The description contained in these
mortgages was the first time such description was used in any
document (R. 139). The subdivision plat of this area was
filed after considerable construction had taken place and
after appellant's lien had been filed. The mortgages affecting the properties in this area were recorded in three groups,
eight of which were recorded February 5th, 1957, eight of
which were recorded February 13th, 1957 and eight of which
were recorded February 18th, 1957.
D. Spencer Grow who is named as one of the cross defendants in appellant's Counter-claim and cross claim for
the foreclosure of appellant's lien is and was at all times
pertinent to the three cases, a man of vast experience in the
real estate mortgage and loan business ( R. 454). He is
president of respondent corporation, Utah Savings & Loan
Association ( R. 456) owning ninety per cent ( 90%) of its
stock. Grow was president of Mid-Utah Construction Company named as another cross defendant by appellant., in
which company Grow and his wife owned 90% of the stock,
l\frs. Grow was Vice President and Secretary of this corporation ( R. 455-456) ; Grow was Vice President of Radio Sales
Corporation in which company he and his wife owned 80%
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to 85% of the stock, this company was also named a cross
defendant by appellant; D. Spencer Grow was also President
of Mortgage Insurance Corporation ( R. 504), Grow Investment and Mortgage Company (R. 512) and Mid-Utah
Broadcasting Company in each of which corporations he and
his wife were controlling stockholders. Each of said companies were named cross defendants by appellant in its
counterclaim and cross claim.
In addition to being a man of vast experience in the
real estate and mortgage loan business, Grow had had considerable experience in the building of homes prior to the
entering into contracts with Robert B. Mecham for construction of homes in the named areas both as owner and as
representative of loan institutions. ( R. 454)
One out of every four mortgages made by respondent,
was made to a corporation of which Grow was president
( R. 490), and 95% of construction loans made by respondent were made to Grows controlled corporations (R. 538).
In August, 1955, Robert B. Mecham started construction of houses for Grow in an area designated as the Keyridge Heights area ( R. 147). Construction was continued
from Keyridge Heights area into Keyridge Heights Plat "B"
area adjoining Keyridge Heights until about October, 1956
( R. 512-513) Work was commenced in these areas before
the mortgages on the properties were recorded ( R. 515).
There were 58 houses to be built in Keyridge ( Ro 163) .
Properties in Keyridge and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" were
owned by several of Grow controlled corporations and building was financed by respondent, Utah Savings & Loan Association ( R. 528) o Mecham thought he was dealing with
0
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\tr. Grow and did not know to begin with that he was dealing with Grow corporations (R. 153). Some of the homes
being built by Mecham for Grow in the Keyridge area are
not yet finished ( R. 518). Mecham found' he was losing
n1oney on Keyridge from the first house (R. 168). He was
losing about $1500.00 a house (R. 172) and he so informed Grow ( R. 174). It became necessary for one of
Grow's companies, Grow Investment and Mortgage Company
to spend money on the homes in the Keyridge area in order
to bring some of these houses to a point of completion
( R. 518). In addition to monies paid by Grow's companies
to bring some of the houses to a point of completion it would
take some $25,000 to $35,000 more to complete those houses
being built by Mecham for Grow's companies under contract
in the two Keyridge areas ( R. 522). Grow was aware of the
fact that the houses contracted to be built by Mecham in the
Keyridge areas were not completed ( R. 524-525). Grow
did not know at any time during the year 1956 what portion
of the contract price agreed to be paid by his companies to
Mecham had been advanced (R. 525).
While houses in Keyridge Heights also referred to as
Keyridge, and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" which Mecham
was building under contract for Grow's companies were
being built were not being completed, and Grow having knowledge of the fact that Mecham was losing money on his building for Grow in the two Keyridge areas, still respondent,
through Grow made loans to Mecham of $89,000 on seven
Schauerhamer area properties (R. 140, 528, 756). Grow
made no investigation as to Mecham's financial ability to
perform his agreements, neither did he inquire as to Mecham's
financial condition ( R. 246, 516, 528, 531). Respondent
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had no cut and dried procedure in making construction loans,
as to financial requirements of a borrower, until recently

( R. 536, 541 ) .
The work in the Keyridge areas had not been completed
at the time of the trial of the cases. Most of the workmen
were moved by Mecham into the Schauerhamer area at the
time that property was acquired ( R. 756).
Grow told Mecham upon learning that Mecham was
losing money on his buildings that he would let Mecham
build 43 homes north of the Keyridge area using the same
plans at a base price of $2000 to ·$3000 more than the price
fixed on the Keyridge houses (R. 175).
When loans were made on the LaMesa area by respondent to Mecham, a service fee of $1350 was charged on each
loan by respondent (R. 544). Upon an examination of respondent company by the State Banking Department it was
determined that such charge was not legal, therefore each of
these 24 loans were credited with $1350. Respondent's
foreclosure proceeding is based on each of the 24 LaMesa
mortgages being reduced in principal by the sum of $1350,
which sum is I 0% of the face of the mortgages ( R. 546-7).
This credit made a total of $32,400.00 ( R. 549) which the
borrower, Mecham, never did receive. On the day of the
opening of the trial the credit to these LaMesa mortgages ,,·as
entered by respondent ( R. 547). Six percent of the ten
percent service fee held out by respondent on each mortgage
in the LaMesa area was paid to Allied Properties, a Grow
owned corporation for house plans ( R. 549). The plans
were those used in the Keyridge areas ( R. 551) .
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There was $30,000 advanced by respondent out of the
La,lesa mortgage money before any work was done In
that area (R. 250).
Appellant, Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company was a
supplier of plumbing materials and fixtures which were
used in the construction of houses built by Robert B. Mecham
in each area including Keyridge sometimes referred to as
Key ridge Heights and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" ( R. 575)
and in addition to having supplied plumbing materials and
fixtures to each of the houses built in the areas affected by
each of the actions herein above referred to and the two
Keyridge areas, appellant furnished plumbing supplies and
fixtures which were delivered to a stockpile on the Keyridge areas ( R. 574) which went into construction of houses
on six other properties in the Schauerhamer area not affected
by the mortgages being foreclosed on in case Civil No.
20,591 ( R. 5 78) and also a tract on which one house was
constructed in the city of Provo, Utah. ( R. 585). Other
than the one property situated in the city of Provo, each of
the other tracts are located in the Orem, Utah, area and in
the same general area, the Keyridge and Schauerhamer area
being two blocks apart are not contiguous to the Rowley,
LaMesa area. The Keyridge, Schauerhamer area is located
to the west of U. S. Highway No. 91 and the Rowley, LaMesa
area is located to the east of that highway, about 2 miles
from the Keyridge, Schauerhamer area Pltff. Ex. 41,
Case 20575 (R. 594). Appellant having made delivery as
instructed by Robert B. Mecham, the contractor, delivered
its materials to but two areas as designated by the contractor
where the materials were stockpiled by Mecham one of
which was on the Key ridge area ( R. 5 78) not affected by
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either one of the three actions before the Court and the other
point of delivery was on the LaMesa area which property is
affected by Case No. 20,575 (R. 557) (R. 580) (R. 626)
from which points plumbing materials were taken by the employees of the contractor and used in each area as houses
were made ready to receive such materials ( R. 579, 580).
No designation as to where plumbing materials were being
used and no segregation of accounts was made by Mecham
(R. 579) and Mecham advised appellant that it was not
necessary to designate the place where plumbing materials
were being used and that it was not necessary to segregate
accounts as it made no difference ( R. 622).
Grow was on and about the properties from time to time
and made no objection to the practice of materials being
taken from Keyridge and LaMesa stockpiles and being used
in the several areas (R. 612, 613). Having no record as to
the amount and kind of materials and fixtures which went
into each house and having supplied the same under one
open account (R. 581), appellant filed its lien on all of
the properties on which its materials were used. There was
no new contract or account as delivery location was added or
changed by Mecham (R. 580, 581).
Appellant having been named as a party defendant to
respondent, Utah Savings & Loan Association's mortgage
foreclosure actions, answered in each case and filed its
counterclaim and cross complaint praying for the foreclosure
of its lien as to those properties affected by the mortgage
foreclosure actions, seeking equitable relief under the equally
aportionable rule, it not being possible to tell definitely what
plumbing material went into each house (R. 613-616), and
also seeking a judgment against respondent, Utah Savings
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and Loan Association, and Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company,
which companies appellant claims are the true owners of
the properties affected by appellant's lien, the owners having failed to furnish a performance bond as required by
~ertion 14-2-2 UCA 1953.
Appellant has another action pending, not now before
thi~ court in which it seeks foreclosure of its lien as to those
properties covered by its lien which are situated in the
Keyridge area and not affected by these cases, that property
not being described in any of respondent's mortgages being
foreclosed.
Robert B. Mecham named as a defendant in each of the
actions now before this court who was the contractor and
who constructed houses in each area affected, admitted the
delivery by appellant and receipt by him of plumbing materials and fixtures in the amount claimed ( R. 581), he
further admitted the correctness of the account ( R. 583),
and that the account was one open account ( R. 579)
( R. 597). Mecham admitted that delivery was made by
appellant in accordance with instructions given by Mecham
to appellant to two points of delivery one upon the Keyridge area, the other upon the LaMesa area and that upon
delivery having been made by appellant to those points of
delivery appellant had no control over the materials. He
further admitted the taking of plumbing materials furnished
by appellant from the points of delivery designated by him
where they were stockpiled and admitted using same in each
area as houses were made ready to receive those materials
( R. 580). Materials were stockpiled before work was commenced on the LaMesa area. The evidence shows the building in the several areas was treated at all times as one project
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in the ordering and use of materials received from appellant.
(R. 578-579). Houses were not completed in one area
before Mecham fanned out and moved into one of the other
areas, but work was being carried on in all areas at one
and the same time ( R. 203) ( R. 207). Appellant delivered
materials to the Keyridge area as early as June 6, 1956
(R. 633).
When Mecham started the last seven houses in the
Schauerhamer area he found he was getting himself out on
a limb, ready to be sawed off. It was necessary to get new
building, new work, and new money as fast as possible in
order to pay bills on Grow's Keyridge properties (R. 303)
and also on houses Mecham was building for Grow in the
Schauerhamer area. (R. 214) (R. 236). It was a matter
of paying old bills. Not all of the houses being built by
Mecham in the Schauerhamer area have been completed.
Robert B. Mecham, the contractor was broke and in
order for him to continue building and to get financing for
building it was necessary for him to fan out and get more
properties which could be and which were mortgaged to
respondent. (R. 301). Mecham had no monies with which
to purchase the Rowley and LaMesa properties and admitted
that while he took title in his name he was following instructions given him by D. Spencer Grow in so doing (R. 247).
The monies used for the purchase of the Rowley and LaMesa
properties were furnished by respondent through mortgages
placed on the LaMesa properties {R. 233-R. 248).
Grow did not request that Mecham make any segregation nor did he inquire of Mecham if he was making any
segregation of materials going into the various areas

(R. 612).
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The mortgages were not entitled to he recorded as to the
Lal\Iesa properties, the same not having been executed as
required by the laws of Utah. Mecham and his wife did not
appear before the notary public and acknowledge signing
the same (R. 318).
The trial court entered judgment for appellant as
against Robert B. Mecham in the amount claimed by appellant's lien and ruled that the lien of appellant was invalid,
holding as its reason, appellant did not designate the amount
of the lien claimed against each property. The trial court
failed to enter judgment against the owners of properties
who undisputedly engaged the services of Robert B. Mecham
to build on their properties on their behalf even though it
was admitted that no performance bond had been filed, as
required by the laws of Utah.
Respondent caused lien waivers to be prepared (R. 587)
in which numerous properties were described, the lien wavers
were furnished to appellant with a request to have same
executed by appellant which appellant refused to do (R. 327)
(R. 586). The properties described in appellant's lien are
those properties described in the lien waivers. Appellant
refused to sign the lien waivers because they included properties in the Keyridge area in addition to the other areas
(Defts. Ex. 50 & Ex. 51) (R. 587).
At the pre-trial and when appellant introduced its lien
into evidence objection was made as to its validity by respondent, because appellant had not specified the amount
clain1ed as against each property. Appellant through its
counsel stated that it would not designate the amount as
claimed against each property at the trial because it could
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not do so. Therefore as counsel stated, appellant claimed a
lien in the full amount against each property, appellant having delivered its materials as directed to but two areas.
Appellant pleaded and urged the doctrine of estoppel to
the claim of respondent as being prior in time and superior
to the lien of appellant.
There is very little conflicting and contradictory evidence in the record insofar as the evidence is applicable to
appellant's case.
The trial court applied the apportionment rule in its
decision in favor of lien claimants Masonry Specialties and
Supply Co., Central Utah Block Co. and Geneva Rock
Products Co. each as to their claimed lien against LaMesa
area and as to Geneva Rock Products Co. as to both LaMesa
and Rowley areas but refused to apply the same rule to the
lien of this appellant.
The trial court ruled that the mortgages affecting the
LaMesa area were not mortgages for future advances.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETERMINING THAT THE LIEN OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY,
IS INVALID AND THAT THE SAME IS INFERIOR TO
THE LIEN OF THE MORTGAGES OF PLAINTIFF AND
RESPONDENT, AND IN FAILING TO ENTER A DECREE
FORECLOSING THE LIEN OF APPELLANT.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
BUILDING OF HOUSES IN EACH OF THE AREAS
COVERED BY THE LIEN OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT WAS TREATED IN ALL RESPECTS AS ONE
ENTIRE PROJECT, AND THAT IT WAS ONE PROJECT
INSOFAR AS THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT IS AFFECTED.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM
WAS AGENT FOR MID-UTAH BROADCASTING COMPANY, GROW INVESTMENT AND MORTGAGE COMPANY, AND RADIO SALES CORPORATION WHICH
COMPANIES THROUGH ITS AGENT, D. SPENCER
GROW CONSTRUCTED HOUSES IN KEYRIDGE
HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION AND SCHAUERHAMER SUBDIVISION AND THAT SAID MID-UTAH BROADCASTING COMPANY FAILED TO REQUIRE ROBERT B.
MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO FURNISH A PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY WITH TITLE 14-2-2
UCA, 1953, AND THEREFORE, SAID MID-UTAH
BROADCASTING COMPANY BECAME LIABLE TO DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING
SUPPLY COMPANY FOR MATERIALS FURNISHED TO
THAT PROPERTY AFFECTED BY CASE NO. 20,591
DESIGNATED AS SCHAUERHAMER AREA.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO FIND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM TOOK TITLE TO
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PROPERTIES DESIGNATED AS ROWLEY AND LaMESA
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT AND THAT RESPONDENT WAS THE REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST AND THAT ROBER B. MECHAM WAS
THE AGENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND· RESPONDENT AND
THAT PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REQUIRE ROBERT B. MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO
FURNISH A PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY
WITH TITLE 14-2-2 UCA, 1953, AND THAT DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO
PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT AS THE SAME AFFECTS THE PROPERTIES
SITUATED IN THE ROWLEY AND LaMESA AREAS.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE EQUAL APPORTIONABLE
RULE.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO DECREE THAT THE MORTGAGES INVOLVED IN EACH OF SAID ACTIONS WERE INVALID
AS TO APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY
COMPANY, THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN EXECUTED
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO FIND THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IN EACH OF SAID
ACTIONS PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ANY RIGHTS AS BEING
PRIOR AND SUPERIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETERMINING
THAT THE LIEN OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT,
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY, IS INVALID
AND THAT THE SAME IS INFERIOR TO THE LIEN OF
THE MORTGAGES OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
AND IN FAILING TO ENTER A DECREE FORECLOSING
THE LIEN OF APPELLANT.
Appellant's lien on which action was brought to foreclose the same in the three cases consolidated for trial was
introduced and received in evidence at the pre-trial hearing
of the cases as consolidated for trial. Upon appellant
offering the lien in evidence, objection was made by respondent to the validity of the lien which objection was based on
( 1) the lien fails to conform to the laws of Utah in that the
properties are not separately stated, and ( 2) the lien fails to
designate the amount claimed against any particular lot or
property or any house referred to in the lien.
The lien was received in evidence notwithstanding the
fact that appellant's counsel stated that appellant would not
and could not show the value and amount of the material
which went into each house, this because appellant had no
record neither did appellant have any control over the materials after they were delivered as directed by Mecham the
Contractor, to two points of delivery where the materials
'rere stockpiled and from which materials were taken by
l\Iecham as houses were made ready in each area to receive
the materials.
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Approximately twenty days of trial did not bring out
other or different evidence.
The evidence shows and it was admitted by Mecham,
the contractor, that he ordered the plumbing materials for appellant, that he used the same, some in each of the houses
in each area, that he ordered the materials on one open account, that materials of the value charged for by appellant
w.ere received by him and used in the houses in each area,
and that the amount claimed as due and owing by appellant
was correct. Mecham further admitted that appellant had
no control over the materials after the same were delivered
by appellant to stockpile as designated by him, that delivery
was made by appellant under Mecham's orders and under his
directions to the two points of delivery, one on the Keyridge
area and one on the LaMesa area. He admitted that materials were taken from the stockpile in each area as houses
were made ready to receive plumbing materials, that plumbing materials were taken from the stockpile in Keyridge
area and used in the two Keyridge areas, in the Schauerhamer
area as that area was being built on, then in the Rowley
and LaMesa areas as these two areas were being improved.
Mecham also admitted that materials which were stockpiled
in the rock building on the LaMesa area were not only used
on the LaMesa area but also taken from that stockpile and
used on the Rowley, Schauerhamer and Keyridge areas, and
in a building in Provo, Utah, that building was going on in
each area at the same time. Mecham further admitted
that materials were delivered by appellant to the two points
of delivery between those dates specified in the lien, there is
no contradition as to these facts. Excerpts from the testimony by Mecham as to same is as follows: (Page 579)
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Q.

Now, were these materials-plumbing materials received and ordered from Ludlow Plumbing
Supply Company on an open account?
A.

Yes, they were.

Q.

Did you, as plumbing materials were being
used from one area to another, instruct Mr. Allred
or anyone else to make any designation or segregation
of the accounts?
A.

No, we did not.

Q.

Did you, on your records, make any segregation or designation of the accounts as to where
plumbing materials were being used in the several
areas and the various houses on those several areas?
A.

No. We didn't make any designation.

Q.

Did you give any orders to Mr. Allred or
to anyone in your employment as materials were being taken from this stock pile to make any records
as to where those materials were going?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Now, was there any discontinuance of stock
piling in the Keyridge area?
A. Yes, We changed our point of unloading to
LaMesa after we had-after the construction was
fairly well along in LaMesa.

Q.

Did you then direct where materials were to
be delivered when you changed over to LaMesa?
A. I instructed the plumbers to have a central
place to unload the materials. I didn't direct the distribution to the various houses.

Q.

No. But you did direct them to have a location, did you, on LaMesa?
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A.

Yes, that's right.

Q.

Were materials distributed, do you know,
from those points of delivery to these other projects,
or these other areas?
A.

They were on occasion.

Q. Were materials delivered from the LaMesa
area to Keyridge?
A.

Yes, they were in some cases.

Q.

Were materials delivered from LaMesa
area-that is, plumbing materials to the Schauerharner area?
A.

In some rare occasions they were.

Q.

Were materials delivered from the LaMesa
area to the Rowley area?
A.

Yes, some.

Q.

Now, when you made the change to-instruction to have deliveries made to the LaMesa area,
did you have any new contract or agreement with
Ludlows as to setting up a new account for that-for
the delivery of those materials?
A. No.
rangement.

We went on the same original ar-

Q.

You carried on the same open account, did

A.

Yes, that is right.

you?

Q.
tion.

That continued throughout the whole operIsn't that correct?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

Was the same practice used in the distribution of material from the LaMesa area to these
other areas, insofar as the manner of not keeping
records were concerned, as to where the materials
were being used?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Did you instruct your men as they were
taking materials-plumbing materials from the LaMesa area to mak~ any record as they were taking
them, as to where those materials were being used?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

When materials were delivered by Ludlows,
according to your instructions to your men, Mr.
Mecham, did Ludlows have any control from thereon
as to where they were to be used?
A.

No. They had no control.

Respondent consistently argued at the trial of the case,
and apparently convinced the trial court, that because appellan_t could not specify the materials which went into each
house and the cost of same and further because appellant
seeks to foreclose its lien as the same covers only that
property affected by the three pending cases here before
the court that appellant's lien is invalid. It is apparent that
respondent confuses the foreclosure of a lien and the filing
of a lien. Appellant was obliged to seek the application of
the equitable equal a pportionable rule and thus seek recovery of that portion of its lien in these actions which afrected that property liened and which is affected by the
mortgages being foreclosed on by respondent, appellant having been named as a defendant to respondent's foreclosure
action and having been required to foreclose its lien as to
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those properties affected by respondent's mortgage in the
same action. Appellant must look to recovery of the balance
of its claim on other properties liened through actions separate and apart from the three cases here before the court,
one of which is pending in the district court, as same covers
those properties liened by appellant and not affected by
these actions and not affected by respondent's mortgages here
being foreclosed on. That is to say, appellant having furnished plumbing materials to not only buildings on those
lots covered by respondent's mortgages but also other lots
in the same areas, which lots appellant liened, appellant
can but look to that part of the property affected by the pending actions here before the court to satisfy that proportionate
part of its lien which the property mortgaged and included
in the pending actions bears to the total number of lots covered by appellant's lien. By appellant so doing appellant
is not burdening a portion of the property affected by its
lien with the whole amount of the lien. Respondent contends
that the filing of a lien on each lot in the full amount
of the lien is burdening each lot with the full amount of the
lien, therefore the lien is invalid. True appellant's lien is
in the total amount claimed against the whole of the properties. It could not be otherwise unless appellant could positively specify the amount represented by materials which
went into each house. This it is evident is not possible. A
portion of the testimony of Mecham regarding this fact is
as follows: ( P. 613)

Q.

Now, Mr. Mecham, you stated in the question propounded to you by Mr. Aldrich that you
possibly could make an estimate of the plumbing materials that went into the houses on these several
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projects. I will ask you, could you tell, or would
you know which way the sewer ran from the house
to the sewer line.
A. Not definitely. In some cases, possibly.
Many cases, have very little idea.

Q.

Then you would not know the length of the
sewer line, would you?
A.

No. Not without digging it up.

Q.

Would you know the number of joints in the
sewer line or in the water line?
A.

No.

That would be impossible.

Q.

Would you know whether cast iron or transit pipe was used under ground?
A.

No. No way to tell.

Q.

As a matter of fact, there is a considerable difference in the cost of cast iron over transit
pipe, isn't there?
A.
transit.

Yes.

Cast is about twice as expensive as

Q.

Do you know how much waste pipe had
been broken or disappearing on the job?
A.

No.

There is no way I could have known

that.

Q.

Therefore, when you state that one might
have an idea as to what went into a house, it would be
guess work, would it not?
A. There would be a considerable amount of
guess work in it.
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Q.

There is no way of determining the exact
amount after the materials have been placed in the
houses, is there?
A.

None that I know of.

Q.

Do you know, Mr. Mecham, whether cast
iron and transit pipe were used on those projects?
A.

Yes. They were both used.

Q.

Do you know which houses cast iron was
used in and which houses transit pipe was used in?
A.

No.

I am sorry I don't.

Appellant's position is supported by the very recent
case of Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. vs Santa Fe Land Co.
handed down by the Supreme Court of Colorado on Dec. 8,
1958 found in 332 P2d at page 892, which case Is very
much in point.
Brannan was a subcontractor engaged by Harris
Constructors, Inc., the general contractor to surface and pave
a 1567 foot roadway. The paved area was on and traversed
three separate pieces of property one of which was owned
by the Land Company and was constructed to extend the
east lane of Quivas Street northward so as to connect with
a newly constructed warehouse of Sears-Roebuck & Co.,
thus providing for ingress and egress from the latter's warehouse to Quivas Street. After completion of the work
the Land Company paid Harris Constructors, Inc., the general contractor in full. The Harris Company was declared
a bankrupt and none of the moneys paid to it were ever paid
to Brannan. Brannan filed a lien upon the property of
the Land Company for the full amount of the lien. But
because the cost of the roadway could be apportioned on
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a square foot basis among the three properties the court
allo,red Brannan a lien on that portion of the property
which belonged to the Land Company to the extent that
the cost of the portion of the Land Company property bore
to the whole job. In its opinion the court said:
"First question to be determined: Does the Mechanics' Lien Statute supra, subject defendant in
error's land to a lien for the entire contract price involving improvements constructed on other lands?
This question is answered in the negative.
"Omitting the verbiage in 83-3-1 not pertinent to
the ·question the statute provides:
' ... subcontractors ... shall have a lien upon
the property upon which they have rendered
service or bestowed labor or for which they have
furnished materials . . . for the value of such
services rendered or labor done or materials
furnished'
"Brannan's counsel, did not attempt to claim the lien
upon the whole roadway but filed only on the segment
located upon the Land Company's property. By
statute, therefore, the inquiry of the trial court was
limited to determining what labor, services and material were rendered by plaintiff to the property
upon which the lien was claimed."
It will be noted that section 83-3-1 of the Colorado Statute
quoted from above is almost identical with section 38-1-3
UCA 1953, which by omitting the verbiage as was done
by the Colorado Court we find by comparison would read
as follows:
" ... subcontractors ... shall have a lien upon the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
dered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished ... ".
As has heretofore been pointed out, appellant is not
asking this Court to satisfy the whole amount of its claim
out of the properties affected by the three pending actions.
It asks the court to satisfy that portion of the lien which the
number of properties involved in the pending action bears
to the total properties covered by its lien. This is a simple
matter to be determined and the court in equity has the
power to allocate an equal amount to each property when
appellant does not have the right to do so because it had
no record as to the materials furnished to each house. In
support of this argument we refer to Jones on Liens,
Volume II, section 1319, reading as follows:
"A lien claim may be apportioned when practicable
without the aid of any special statute for the purpose.
In an action to enforce a lien for labor performed on
two houses, the fact that the petitioner is not able to
state the precise share of the labor performed on each
house does not necessarily defeat altogether his recovery. The jury rna y sustain his lien against each
house for such certain amounts of labor as they are
satisfied he performed thereon, although they may
not be satisfied that he did not perform more."
This being an equity case a court of equity may apportion the claim on an equal basis where the claimant itself
cannot do so when the lien claimant is unable to specify
with certainty that material which went into each building.
This argument finds further support in Thompson on
Real Property, Per. Ed. Vol. 10, Sec. 5432. p. 432 reading
as follows:
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"A materialman delivering lumber to two buildings
may claim a lien on both, even though he may not be
able to determine definitely what percentage of the
lumber furnished by him was used in one building
and what was used in the other."
In the case of Sargison v Turner, 124 Pac. 379 we find
~y llabus l reading as follows:
"A builder who contracted for the construction of five
dwelling houses, one to be built on a lot in which
defendant had no interest, and who kept no separate
accounts with the several buildings for labor and
materials furnished in their construction could not
assert a single lien against all the defendant's four
houses."
That is to say the lien claimant was obliged to assert his
lien against the five houses for which labor and materials
were furnished.
A most interesting annotation is found on this subject
in 130 ALR at page 424 in which the case of Badger Lum·
her Co. v Holmes, 44 Neb. 244, 62 NW 446, 48 Am. St.
Rep. 726 is quoted from as follows:
"The failure of a mechanics' lienor to show the
proportion of the materials furnished to each parcel
under an agreement by which the lienor was to furnish materials for the erection of buildings on each
of six lots, which materials, when furnished, were
used indiscriminately by the owner, was held ground
for reversal of judgment decreeing a lien for the entire balance due against less than all the parcels for
the improvement of which materials were furnished.
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The whole debt might be charged to all six lots but
all the debt for all the material cannot be charged
to a part of the lots." (Italics added)
This same law is found in Jones on Liens Vol. II,
Sec. 1315.
Regarding this question appellant relies on the case
of U. S. Bldg. & Loan vs Midvale Home Finance Corp.
86 U. 506, 44 P2d 1090. It appears to be the controlling
case in this state to date.
A brief summary of the pertinent facts of the Midvale
case is as follows:
Early in 1930 a finance company undertook to promote the construction and sale of a large number of homes
in Midvale, Utah, on a tract of land known as Lincoln Subdivision. The land was platted into lots or units. In
March of the same year construction work was begun. The
lots or units were sold to various parties on contracts most of
which contracts were either entered into prior to commencement of construction or shortly thereafter. The contractor
failed to carry out its contract and suit for the foreclosure
of a mortgage by the mortgage holder was instituted against
the contractor and lien claimants, also against the unit
purchasers all of whom answered and cross complained.
The court found for the lien claimants over the mortgage
because the work and materials had been furnished prior to
the filing of the mortgage. However the point which we
contend is controlling in the instant cases is this. The unit
holders urged that the liens filed by the lien clai1nants were
fatally defective in that they failed to state the amount and
value of materials and labor furnished to each unit, relying
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on ~ection 3737 Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, now 38-l-8
UCA 1953 ,,;hich provides:
"Liens on several separate properties in one claimLiens against two or more buildings, mining claims
or other improvements owned by the same person or
persons may be included in one claim; but in such
case the person filing the claim must designate
therein the amount claimed to be due to him on each
of such buildings, mining claims or other improvements."
In the Midvale case the court said:
"It is next urged by the unit holders that the liens
filed by the lien claimants are fatally defective in that
they fail to state the amount and value of materials
and labor furnished to each unit. Our attention is
directed to Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 3737, now
R. S. Utah 1933, 52-1-8. It is there provided:
'Liens against two or more buildings, mining claims
or other improvements owned by tlie same person or
persons may be included in one claim; but in such
case the person filing the claim must designate therein
the amount claimed to be due to him on each of such
buildings, mining claims or other improvements.'
"A similar question was involved in the case of
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah, 241, 87 P.
713, 714. The law with respect to the acquisition and
enforcement of mechanics' liens was substantially the
same at the time herein involved as it was at the time
the rights of the parties attached and the decision was
rendered in the Eccles Lumber Company Case. The
unit holders attempt to distinguish that case from the
case in hand upon the ground that in the former case
the two houses had not been sold to two different
persons, while in the instant case the unit holders
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have contracted in severalty for the purchase of the
lands in question."
It is the contention of appellant that the same rule of
law applies in the present cases as applied in the Midvale
case.
In the instant case appellant delivered materials to
Mecham under one contract and on one open account.
It is the delivery of materials under a single contract
which determines the question whether several lots are subject to a lien and not the location of the lots or the matter of
ownership, and the lots need not be contiguous as was the
holding by the Kansas Court in Golden Belt Lumber Co.
v McLean, reported in 26 P2d at page 27 4 in which we find
paragraph one of the syllabus reading as follows:
"Where materials or labor are supplied under single
contract for construction of improvements on noncontiguous town lots, single lien statement timely
filed created lien on all lots."
The evidence in the instant cases shows that materials
were used indiscriminately by the contractor, Mecham, and
Grow the agent of respondent was aware of the manner in
which materials were being so used. Grow made no objection to the method adopted by Mecham at any time during
the construction of houses in each area. There was no segregation of plumbing materials as to any particular lots in
any of the areas.
Our own state law, Sec. 38~1-4 UCA 1953 Is to the
same effect, it provides:
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"AMOUNT OF LAND AFFECTED-LOTS AND
SUBDIVISIONS - MINES- FRANCHISES, FIXTURES AND APPURTENANCES.
"The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and
cover so much of the land whereon such building,
structure or improvement shall be made as may be
necessary for the convenient use and occupation thereof, and in case any such building shall occupy two or
more lots or other subdivisions shall be deemed one
for the p-urpose of this chapter; . . " (Italics supplied)
It appears the above section has not been construed by
our Court except as to mining claims.
In Warrenton Lumber Co. v Smith, 117 Or. 530,
245 Pac. 313 it is said by the Court:
"A materialman who furnishes material for several
disconnected houses built under one entire contract
has a lien in gross against all of the houses, and need
file but one notice including all."
In Sprague lnv. Co. v Mouat Lumber Co., 14 Colo.
App. 197, 60 Pac. 179, cited in 10 ALR at page 1027
we find the following:
"It appeared that under a single contract three houses
were built over four lots of land, owned by the same
person. Holding that a single lien was valid, the
court said:
'Where, however, there is practically no segregation of the lots, and no description of the
land on which the houses are built in the convey-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
ances, so that the lienors may be advised respecting it, and where, also, the proof is, as
here, the lumber went into the houses indiscriminately, it cannot be true the lienor must at his
peril subdivide his claim and assign to each
house as built, the proportion of the debt which
it ought in equity to bear. The evidence shows,
and the court found, the material was delivered
from time to time from November, 1892, until
June 27, 1893,-delivered sometimes at the
houses, sometimes at Freeman's shop on vacant
lots to the north of the property. Some of the
material went into one house, some into another,
and it was impossible by any means known to
dealers in material to ascertain which house the
lumber or the materials went into. Since this
is true, the case is brought clearly within the
decisions of this court'."
While we recognize in the Sprague case there was one
owner still we think the law as therein handed down is
applicable.
It is trusted the Court will adopt and apply the
law as has been contended for herein, however, should
the Court not be inclined to do so then we rely on those
cases cited in 57 CJS Mechanics' Liens, Sec. 43 at page
535 wherein the case of East End Lumber Co. v. Bennett,
187 NE 786, 46 Ohio App. 104 is found from which the
following statement is quoted:
"One who delivers material to an owner·s contractor
on the premises rna y be entitled to a lien therefore
although the material is delivered to another project
by the contractor."
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See also Houston Fire & Casualty Inc. Co. vs. Hales
(Texas) 279 SW2d 389 in which the court said:
"Where a materialman furnishes materials to a
building for a specific construction job, it is not required in order to establish a lien that the materials
should actually enter into the construction, and the
lien cannot be defeated by proof that a part of the
material was used for other jobs.
This rule of law was followed by our own court In
Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. vs. Whitmore 240130, 66 P. 779.
In the Houston case the facts are quite similar to the
instant case. There the supplier furnished materials to be
used on either one project or another, he was not certain
which job the materials were used in as the contractor was
doing two jobs at the same time.
And in Drake Lubr. Co. v Paget Mortgage Co., Oregon.,
27 4 P2d 804, 811 a case where it was evident that it was
difficult for the materialman to make a strictly accurate
statement because materials furnished for one job were used
in another and in which the court said:
"The difficulty which it (materialman) encountered
in arriving at a strictly accurate statement was not
of its own making, but arose from the use by the contractor in one house of materials furnished for use
in another. This Drake could hardly have prevented
for it cannot be expected that a materialman would
be obliged to watch the progress of a structure, to see
that every stick of timber or other material so supplied
by him was used therein."
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The doctrine adopted by the courts as is reflected by
the above cases shows the widely accepted rule and the
one adopted by the Utah courts. An interesting discussion
of this doctrine may be found in 39 ALR 2d at page 398.
It is admitted in the instant case however that the
materials were used in the properties liened.
LOOSE DESCRIPTION
The lien filed by appellant affects more property than
it appeared from the evidence houses were built upon. This
discrepency was not brought about by appellant but by
respondent who furnished the descriptions of that property
which respondent requested a lien waiver on. A comparison
of the description of the property contained in the lien will
show it to be that same property as is described in the
form of lien waiver which respondent sought to have executed by appellant. Certainly respondent at the time
considered appellant to have lien rights as against that
property described in the lien waiver, if not why the lien
waiver?
The evidence shows respondent to have caused the lien
waiver to be prepared and that Mr. Grow discussed the same
with representatives of appellant company when Grow endeavored to pursuade appellant's representative to execute
the waiver which appellant refused to do because the waiver
covered property on which appellant claimed a lien other
than the LaMesa properties.
We find in footnote to Sec. 38-1-3 UCA 1953, the
Annotators cite the Iowa case of Fruden Lumber Co. v Kinnan,
117 Iowa, 93, 90 NW 515 as follows:
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"It is the furnishing of material for a building which
entitles a party to a lien, and its actual use in the
construction thereof need not be shown."
It developed during the trial that the description contained in appellanfs lien covered properties not improved,
also properties on which no materials were furnished by
appellant and also some properties which had been released
from claim of lien on the part of the appellant. It is further
evident that these mistakes were innocent mistakes, not
caused through any fault of appellant but as has been
heretofore said, appellant relied on those descriptions of
the properties used by respondent and contained in the lien
waiver.
The court said In the Golden Belt case, supra as to
such defect:
"Inclusion of town lot on which no materials or services were used in lien statement does not invalidate
lien so far as it relates to other lots on which materials or services were used, but such lot should be
excluded from lien on rendition of judgment."
Reference is also made to the case of Caird Engineering Works v. Seven Up Gold Mining Co., (Montana) Ill
P2d 267 in which case the court said lien statutes should
receive a liberal construction in order to effectuate their
purpose.
It is stated in 40 C.J. p. 219 and subsequent pages as
follows:
"The Courts are liberal in upholding imperfect descriptions, and are reluctant to set aside a mechanics'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
lien claim, merely because of a loose description of
the property. The test generally applied in determining the sufficiency of the description is whether
it will enable one familiar with the locality to identify
the property upon which the lien is intended to be
claimed with reasonable certainty. Facts taken into
consideration in determ.ining the sufficiency of the
description are that the person sought to be charged
could not have been misled."
Most certainly neither Mecham nor respondent could
have been misled in this case. We find in 57 CJS Mechanics' Liens, Sec. 185, p. 736, the following:
"It does not attach to land on which no lienable improvement has been made, nor does it ordinarily extend to land which is outside of, and distinct from
the part or parcel on which the building or improvements stands; but the inclusion in the lien statement
of land on which no improvement has been made does
not invalidate the lien as to the improved land."
And in this same text, Sec. 161, p. 685 we find the
following:
"As a general rule the fact that the claim or statement
describes more land than is subject to the lien does
not defeat the lien as to the land properly subject
thereto if there is no fraudulent intent and no one is
injured thereby."
There is no showing of any in jury to anyone in the
instant cases because appellant liened property not improved. Neither does it appear that there was any fraudulent
intent on the part of appellant in its having liened all the
property, appellant having used the descriptions contained
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In the form of lien waiver furnished to appellant by respondent.

NAMED OWNERS OF PROPERTY
Appellant described many owners as the reputed owners
of the properties affected by the lien. It is evident that
because of the manner in which title to the various properties
was taken that it was impossible for appellant to identify a
particular tract as being owned by a certain owner, this
was especially true because Mecham and respondent both
treated the construction at all times as one in the matter
of improving the properties. A lien is not invalid if
parties other than the owners are named as purported owners
so long as the owner is named. Sec. 38-1-7 UCA 1953 requires name of owner to be given only if known.
In 57 CJS, Sec. 45, at page 538 the law is stated as
follows:
"When labor or materials are furnished to a contractor engaged in the construction of several buildings for different owners, each building with the lot
on which it' stands may be subject to a lien for materials used, in, or labor expended on it, even though
according to but not all authorities, the labor and
materials were furnished indiscriminately for use in
the construction of the several buildings."
Neither the Schauerhamer, Rowley or LaMesa areas
were subdivided therefore it would have taken an engineer
to determine the location of a house with any particular
description.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
BUILDING OF HOUSES IN EACH OF THE AREAS COVERED BY THE LIEN OF APPELLANT WAS TREATED
IN ALL RESPECTS AS ONE ENTIRE PROJECT, AND
THAT IT WAS ONE PROJECT INSOFAR AS THE
RIGHTS OF APPELLANT IS AFFECTED.
It is apparent from the evidence that it would have
been impossible for any of the lien claimants to designate
the amount of their lien as against any particular property,
this is especially true as to the Lal\1esa area in which the
evidence shows that the metes and bounds descriptions used
in the mortgages by respondent do not fit the lots as platted
in the plat which was not filed until some time after construction had been commenced in this area. Neither was
a plat of the property filed in the Schauerhamer area when
mortgages were filed and work was going on in that area,
nor was a plat filed on the Rowley area. Therefore had appellant attempted to designate a particular amount against
a particular lot in the LaMesa area or followed the descriptions used by respondent in its mortgages there would have
been discrepancies between the description and the plot
plan. This discrepency exists in the LaMesa mortgages.
The method of building adopted and carried out by the
contractor, Mecham was a mass production and assembly
line method. Mecham was keeping his crews busy. As
the excavators prepared some properties for the building
of houses they would move to another area and another and
another, then they would come back to areas from ,vhich they
had previously moved, the san1e n1ethod was used as to each
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mechanic. Plumbers roughed in houses in one area then
moved to another area, then as houses were constructed to a
point where finishing plumbing and fixtures were needed,
those materials were taken from the stockpile and used in
that house which was made ready, some in each area were
being finished at the same time. It is evident that plun1bing
materials were being delivered at one and the same time
to the two points of delivery and from each stockpile plun1bing materials were taken and used in each area. Some of
the sewer pipe furnished by appellant was cast iron and some
was transit pipe, cast iron is almost twice the cost of transit
pipe. Appellant had no knowledge as to that material used
in any particular house. Mecham's men would drive
Mecham's truck to the stockpile and take the material to be
used from the point where it had been delivered. There
were times when a part of a delivery made by appellant
some by freight line and some by appellant's own trucks was
left at each of the stockpiles. Appellant's agent being concerned about the manner in which plumbing materials were
being taken from each stockpile and used in each area inquired of Mecham, the contractor, if appellant should not
make some designation as to where plumbing materials
were being used or to be used and a segregation of accounts
as to same and he was advised by Mecham that it was
not necessary, that it made no difference. Mecham did
not keep a record as to where plumbing materials were
being used as same were taken from each stockpile, nor did
he require his workmen to make a record as to same. No
one could tell with any degree of accuracy the amount or
value of plumbing materials which went into each house.
Had appellant delivered only bathtubs, showers, basins and
water closets there would be no problem but in addition
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to same appellant also delivered roughing in materials,
sewer pipe, valves etc.
Even if the trial court were not in error in having refused to find that respondent was the owner of this property,
this does not make appellant's lien invalid, because it is
admitted Mecham was the contractor doing the building on
each area. Mecham admitted there was hut one contract
between him and appellant covering materials furnished by
appellant on each of the areas. He admitted that there was
but one account.
It is evident under the facts of these cases and the
admissions of Mr. Mecham, the contractor, that appellant
had no alternative but to lien all the properties in which its
materials were used and admitted by Mecham to have been
used. The fact that the properties were noncontiguous does
not invalidate the lien of appellant as was the holding of
the Oklahoma Court in Parker v Walker, 48 Okla. 705, 150
P. 690, 10 ALR 1022 in which the court said:
"The syllabus of the court was that 'where a single
entire contract is made with the materialman to
furnish material for building houses on noncontiguous lots, and no request is made to keep separate
accounts of the material which is used in the several
houses, one lien claim rna y be filed against all of the
lots and buildings for which the lien claimant has
furnished material which has actually gone into the
buildings."
From the above case it is evident that the real test is,
did Mecham consider and treat the contract which he made
with appellant as one entire contract in his dealings with
appellant. This ~1echam did do. It further appears from
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the Parker case, supra that the manner in which the party
deals with the materialman is the controlling factor.
Because of the manner in which appellant's materials
were ordered and used by Mecham, appellant's lien must
necessarily be against each of the properties. Respondent and Mecham both considered that appellant had lien
rights against all of the properties, this is clearly evident
because of the request for the lien waiver which was prepared by respondent and which described all of the properties
liened by appellant.
Appellant's contention is supported by Sec. 38-1-4 UCA
1953, supra.
In these cases the court is not called upon to determine
from conflicting evidence whether or not the operation was
treated as one this because Mecham testified to the fact
that it was one account and one contract as between him
and appellant. Mecham's method of operation was assembly
line method and this was admitted by Mr. Grow. The
admissions by Mecham of the fact that it was one account
and one contract with appellant is binding upon respondent.
As to the method used in stockpiling plumbing materials
by Mecham and the use made of same we quote a few excerpts from Mecham's testimony, page 250:

Q.

You have testified Bob, that you had a shop
where cabinets were fabricated in the Keyridge area.

A.
Q.

Yes.

How long did the shop-strike that, please.
How many men were working in the shop at the time
it was located on the Keyridge property?
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A. About four men. We had three or four full
time men, ...

Q.

Now, for what porperties did you do fabricating work in the shop while the shop was located
in Key ridge?
A. We did it for Keyridge. Of course, Schauerharner, some for the Rowley houses, and I even
think we did some for LaMesa. I would have to
check that.

Q.

Now how many houses had planters?

A.

Practically all of the houses did.

Q.

When you say "all the houses", you mean
all the houses in Keyridge, the Schauerhamer houses,
and the Rowley houses?
A. Yes, most of the houses we built had
planters.

Q.

Did that include some of the LaMesa

houses?
A.

Yes, it would.

P.254

Q.

Do you know the date on which you first
ordered materials to be delivered on the Rowley
homes?
A. I don't have the exact date. I do know that
we started around the first of February, and the
materials were ordered from then on for those
houses.

Q.

Give us your best judgment of the first day
that materials would have been ordered and delivered for the Rowley houses.
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A. Some materials had been delivered to the
shop for the Rowley houses prior to construction
in any amount on the Rowley houses. They had
been delivered to the shop so it could be locked up.

Q.
A.
ruary.

When did those deliveries commence?
I would say right around the lst of Feb-

Q.

Would you say that they had been made
by the I st of February?
A.

Yes I would say so.

Q.

Will you describe the shop please?
one that was locat~d on the LaMesa property?

The

A. This is a block building with a cement floor
which had been used for a fruit packing shed, which
I bought along with the ground in LaMesa from
the Rowley people, and which, eventually~ 've set
up for our shop.

Q.

And materials were delivered to that building on the LaMesa property by February lst, 1956?
A. That is my belief. The reason for it is
materials could be locked up in that particular
building.

Q.

Now, do you know if any of the materials
that were delivered to that building ultimately found
their way into the houses on the LaMesa property?
A.

I could state that some did.

P.258
Q. What arrangements did you have regarding
plumbing supplies?
A. For some time in Keyridge we had a double garage set up for the storage of plumbing supplies.
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We used this as a central depot, so to speak, for our
supplies the houses in Keyridge; also Schauerhamer, and some of this went over on the first Rowley
houses.

Q.

Did you have any point of delivery for
plumbing supplies, at any time, other than the point
of delivery in Keyridge?
A. Yes, eventually, we delivered plumbing
supplies into LaMesa.

Q.

Where in LaMesa were the plumbing supplies delivered?
A. Originally they were delivered to the shop,
because it could be locked. Eventually, when a
double garage wasl prepared so it could be locked,
they were delivered to that garage.

Q. What happened to the materials after they
were delivered to the garage?
A. The plumbers used one of the trucks we had
there a good part of the time. They could come with
their truck to the central location, pick up what they
needed for a given house, and take it to that house
and install it.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS AGENT FOR MID-UTAH BROADCASTING
COMPANY, GROW INVESTMENT AND MORTGAGE
COMPANY, AND RADIO SALES CORPORATION
WHICH COMPANIES THROUGH THEIR AGENT~ D.
SPENCER GROW CONSTRUCTED HOUSES IN KEYRIDGE 1-IEIGHTS SUBDIVISION AND SCHAUER-
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HAMER SUBDIVISION AND THAT SAID MID-UTAH
BROADCASTING COMPANY FAILED TO REQUIRE
ROBERT B. MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO FURNISH A
PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY WITH TITLE
14-2-2 UCA, 1953, AND THEREFORE, SAID MID-UTAH
BROADCASTING COMPANY BECAME LIABLE TO i\PPELLANT FOR MATERIALS FURNISHED TO THAT
PROPERTY AFFECTED BY CASE NO. 20,591 DESIGNATED AS SCHAUERHAMER AREA.
There is no contradiction of the fact that lots in the
Keyridge area were owned by companies owned or controlled
by D. Spencer Grow, certain ones of his companies holding
title to certain designated lots and that Robert B. Mecham
was constructing houses in the Keyridge area for each owner
at one and the same time without regard as to which company
held title to any particular lot. There is no contradiction of
the fact that appellant furnished plumbing materials to
Mecham for these construction jobs as early as June 6, 1956
and that while Mecham was building in the Keyridge area he
fanned out into the Schauerhamer area where he commenced
some construction work on his own, he did, however convey
some of these properties to Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company
and also built homes for this same company in that area.
Therefore under Title 14-2-2 UCA 1953, appellant was entitled to judgment against Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company
even if the lien of appellant as to this property was invalid.
It is further evident that respondent company did the
financing of the building of these properties and that respondent loaned Grow's companies enough money on each
of the Keyridge houses to not only pay for the construction
of the house but to pay for the lot.
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Respondent admits that a portion of the Schauerharner property was acquired by some of Grow's companies
and built upon at the same time building was going on in
the Keyridge area. It is evident that some of Ludlow's materials went into this property which evidence is undisputed.
It is also evident that Grow's company Mid-Utah Broadcasting Co. took title at a subsequent date, to those properties in
Schauerhamer in which title had been taken in the name of
Mecham and this was before the buildings thereon had been
completed.
The evidence in these cases shows without a doubt that
respondent is the real party in interest and the owner of the
properties affected and designated as Rowley and LaMesa
areas. Should the court not agree, however, with this statement we refer to those authorities treating the cases heretofore cited in which a contractor does work on several buildings for different owners which is not unusual at the present
time.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO FIND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM TOOK TITLE TO
PROPERTIES DESIGNATED AS ROWLEY AND LaMESA
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT AND THAT
RESPONDENT WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
AND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS THE AGENT
FOR RESPONDENT AND RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REQUIRE ROBERT B. MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO
FURNISH A PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY
WITH TITLE 14-2-2 UCA, 1953, AND THAT APPELLANT
IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO PERSONAL JUDGMENT
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AGAINST RESPONDENT AS THE SAME AFFECTS THE
PROPERTIES SITUATED IN THE ROWLEY AND LaMESA AREAS.
It is appellant's contention which is amply supported by
the evidence that while title to the various properties in these
areas did appear vested of record in other na1nes, the real
party in interest at all times was respondent, respondent was
the party who furnished all monies not only for the construction of houses on the properties hut also for the purchase of
the properties. The evidence conclusively shows that respondent furnished more than the total cost of the real estate
and the contract price for the building thereon on the Keyridge property. Respondent financed the building on the
Schauerhamer properties and respondent furnished all monies with which the Rowley and LaMesa properties \vere
acquired.
The evidence shows that when Mecham went into the
Rowley and LaMesa areas he was so heavily in debt that he
was unable to complete the construction of the houses contracted to he built in either the Keyridge area or in the
Schauerhamer area, he had to get more land on which to
raise money in order to use that money toward completion
of houses for Grow in the Keyridge and Schauerhamer areas.
lVIecham testified to the fact that he had no money when
he negotiated with Rowleys for the acquisition of the Lal\Iesa
property, that he made the payment called for by the contract
out of monies furnished to him by respondent. He testified
to the fact that he was instructed by Grow as agent of respondent to do the negotiating for the property and to take title or
enter into a contract for the purchase of the property in his
(Mecham's) name and that respondent would furnish the
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money. This was done. Respondent was the real party
in interest and being such is liable to appellant should the
judgment of the trial court as to the question of the validity
of appellant's lien be affirmed. The same is true as to the
four Rowley lots.
It is evident that the plan was to build in the LaMesa
area and move into that area during construction in the Keyridge and Schauerhamer areas. The plot plan was delayed
in filing and building permits could not be had for the
LaMesa area. Mecham wanted to keep his crew busy and
while waiting for approval of the plot plan for LaMesa
he negotiated with Rowleys for the four lots across the
street from LaMesa. Respondent furnished the money for
this purchase. Grow was doing the very thing which Mecham testified he had agreed to do when Mecham found
he was losing money in the Keyridge area, that was to get
more property for Mecham to build on at a higher contract
price.
The evidence shows that Grow was at all times the president of respondent company and the controlling stockholder
therein, that he was president and controlling stockholder in
each of the companies which held title to various properties,
that he sat on the loan committee and approved loans to each
of his companies by respondent company, that three out of
every four loan~ made by respondent were made to Grow
companies and that 95% of the construction loans made
by respondent were made to Grow's companies.
The evidence further shows that respondent advanced
$30,000 out of Lal\tlesa mortgages before any work \ras
started in that area. The 1noney from LaMesa loans instead
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of going into construction of houses in that area was used
to bring Grow's Keyridge and Schauerhamer houses nearer
to a point of completion.
It is evident that Grow observed materials being stockpiled on the Keyridge and LaMesa areas, that he observed
same being taken from those stockpiles and being used at
each area, that Grow made no objection to such method of
construction by Mecham. And why should Grow object to
such method, his company, respondent herein was the party
to be benefited and to be affected by such method of
operation.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE EQUAL APPORTIONABLE
RULE.
Section 38-1-3 UCA 1953, which is applicable is hereinabove set out omitting the verbiage.
It is evident without contradiction that appellant furnished plumbing materials which went into that improved
property liened and upon which appellant seeks a foreclosure
and it is further evident without contradiction that the plumbing materials were furnished either to the owner or to the
agent for the owner acting by authority of the owner.
The difficulty with which appellant was confronted in
not being able to designate or specify that material which
went into each house was not of appellant's own making.
Appellant followed instructions and orders in making delivery of its materials to the stockpile of materials at two
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convenient points, it had no control over the plumbing materials after delivery was so made. No one could determine
with any degree of certainty whether the waste lines are
of galvanized steel or transit pipe without uncovering same,
nor can it be determined what the length of same is, neither
can it be determined as to the number of L' s or joints which
are buried. Without appellant being able to specify with some
degree of certainty the value of the materials which went
into each house it is required under the statute to place a
blanket lien on all of the property on which its materials
were used.
Then too even if appellant could have specified the
amount of materials which went into each house it would
have been most difficult to designate who the owner was
because so many different owners appear of record, especially is this true as to the Keyridge area, and the metes
and bounds descriptions in the LaMesa area do not fit the
plot plan which was not filed until a time after appellant
had filed its lien.
In support of appellant's argument regarding this point
reference is made to the Brannan case cited under point I,
Jones on Liens Vol. II, Sec. 1319 and Thompson on Real
Property, Per. Ed. Vol. 10, Sec. 5432, p. 432 both of
,vhich authorities are quoted from under point I herein, also
Sec. 38-1-3 UCA 1953, supra.
It is evident from these authorities that a court may
apply the rule and apportion the amount equally as to each
property where the lien claimant cannot do so, especially
where the contractor adn1its that appellant's materials went
into the properties. At the trial of the cases appellant
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requested the trial court to adopt and apply the rule in the
following manner. There are 52 improved properties in
all affected by appellant's lien, 24 of which are located
in the LaMesa area, 6 of which are located in the Shauerhanler area, 4 of which are located in the Row ley area,
all covered by mortgages held by respondent which are being
foreclosed on in the three cases here before the court. The
original lien designated the amount owing and claimed to
be due in the sum of $18,653.67. It appeared at the trial
that an error of $62.7 4 was made in the amount and that
the same included interest in the sum of $~291.64, which
Mecham agreed to pay, but appellant reduced its claim in
these amounts leaving an amount as claimed of $18,299.29,
with attorney's fees of $25.00 makes a total of $18,324.29,
divided by 52 being the total number of lots makes the sum
of $352.12 per lot, there being a total of 34 lots affected
by the three cases here before the court the court should have
found appellant's lien superior to respondent's mortgages
and the court should have granted appellant judgment of
foreclosure of its lien in the sum of $352.12 as against each
lot affected by respondent's mortgages or a total in the three
cases of $11,972.08. The priority of appellant's lien over the
mortgages dating back to the time of delivery of materials
to the Keyridge area from which the whole operation fanned
out.
This position is supported by Sec. 38-1-5, UCA 1953
which provides as follows:
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back to,
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the
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structure or improvement, and shall have priority
over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which
may have attached subsequently to the time when the
building, improvement or structure was commenced,
work begun, or first material furnished on the
ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and
which was unrecorded at the time the building structure or improvement was commenced, work begun,
or first material furnished on the ground."
There are l l lots affected by appellant's lien pending
in another action which lots are located in the Keyridge area,
six lots in the Schauerhamer area and one lot in the City of
Provo which appellant must look to for the balance of its
claim.
It is evident that appellant is not seeking to burden
any particular lot or any particular area with the whole
amount of its lien or in an amount in excess of that portion
of the lien allocated to each lot. It would be much to
the advantage of appellant were the rule otherwise so that
appellant could have filed its lien on one area in the full
amount of its lien.
It is apparent the above rule was applied by the court
as to those other lien claimants in this action in whose favor
the court ruled as the same affected the LaMesa area and
Geneva Products lien which was apportioned bet,\·een LaMesa
and Rowley areas. Those claimants were not required to
specify the amount of their lien claimed against each one of
the 24 lots located in the LaMesa area, and even though the
amount of Geneva's claim as to the Rowley area '\Tas stipulated to, the equal apportionn1ent rule was applied by the
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court, still the court refused to apply the same rule in
favor of the appellant.
From the above authorities and statute it is apparent
that appellant must rely on the equitable doctrine provided
for such cases and ask the court to make the apportionment
to appellant's claim.
As to the overstatement of the amount of appellant's
lien it was as a result of an innocent mistake with no intent
to defraud. No one was misled or prejudiced thereby. And
as stated in 57 CJS Sec. 153, subsection B. page 676 under
such facts the lien may be enforced.
In the application of this rule it poses no problem in the
foreclosure proceeding as Sec. 38-1-15 UCA 1953 provides
for the sale of the property in satisfaction of the lien and
costs as in the case of foreclosure of mortgages.

POINT VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO DECREE THAT THE MORTGAGES INVOLVED IN
EACH OF SAID ACTIONS WERE INVALID AS TO APPELLANT, THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN EXECUTED
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The evidence shows that Mrs. Robert Mecham appeared personally upon only one occasion to sign mortgages
at the offices of the Utah Savings and Loan Associ~tion and
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that on all other occasions, by the admission of the plaintiff,
the mortgages were signed by her outside of the presence of
the notary and that the proof of signature was telephoned
to Mrs. Gardner an employee of respondent and, in turn,
relayed to Mrs. Peterson, also an employee of respondent.
The mortgages therefore did not impart notice to the lien
claimants at the time of their recording the acknowledgments
were not conforming with the statutory requirements.
The statutory provisions regarding this point are as
follows:

57-2-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLED·GMENT.
"A certificate of acknowledgment to any instrument in writing affecting the title to any real
property in this state may be substantially in the
following form:
Sate of Utah, County of ---------------------------On the ________ day of ________________ , 19______ , personally appeared before me ______________________________________ , the
signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same."

57-3-l, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. CERTIFICATE
OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OR OF PROOF OF EXECUTION A PREREQUISITE.
"'A certificate of the acknowledgment of any
conveyance., or of the proof of the execution thereof
as provided in this title. signed and certified by the
officer taking the same as provided in this title, shall
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entitle such conveyance with the certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which the real estate is
situated.'' (Italics supplied)
57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
p ARTS NOTICE.

RECORD IM-

"Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title,
and every patent to lands . . . shall, from the time of
filing the same with the recorder of record, impart
notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lienholders
shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice."
(Italics supplied)
57-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, MANNER OF
ACKNOWLEDGING OR PROVING CONVEYANCES.
"Every conveyance in writing whereby any
real estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be
acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner
hereinafter provided."
57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, RECORDING
NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE-OPERATION
AND EFFECT INTEREST OF PERSON NOT
NAMED IN INSTRUMENT.
"Every conveyance of real estate and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may be
effected, to operate as notice to third persons shall he
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proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of
the recorder of the county in which such real estate
is situated, but shall be valid and binding between
the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have had actual notice." (Italics supplied)
I Am. Jur. Sec. 69 states:
"While there is some authority to the effect that
in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, an acknowledgment may be taken over a telephone, a
rna jority of the few cases discussing the question
hold that where the personal presence of a party before an officer is required by the statute, an acknowledgment cannot be taken over a telephone."
The following cases are in point.
Myers v. Eby, 33 Idaho 266, I93 P 77;
Roach v. Francisco, I38 Tenn. 357, I97 S.W. I099,
I A.L.R. I074;
Annot. I2 A.L.R. 538; 58 A.L.R. 604;
Humble Oil and Ref. Co. v. Downey, I43 Tex. 577,
I83 s.w. 2d 426;
Charlton v. Richard Gill Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 285
s.w. 2d 80I.
Reference is also made to 59 A.L.R. 2d 1293, with
Annotations beginning on page 1301, ( I315) where numerous cases are cited holding that latent defects in an acknowledginent prevents constructive notice. The principal
case cited in this annotation, Citizens National Bank in
Zanesville, Appt. v. Bertha G. Denison, et al, I33 N.E. 2d
329, deals with priorities between mortgage holders the
author says:
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"That the recording of a defectively acknowledged mortgage did not constitute constructive notice
to the subsequent mortgagees and give it priority over
the subsequently recorded mortgages; and that the
defective execution could be proved by evidence of
defects not apparent on the face of the instrument."
See also 25 A.L.R. 2d 1124, for additional annotated
cases and specifically Section 49 thereof, page 1166, which,
among other cases, refers to Litile v. Bergdahl Oil Company,
60 Idaho 662, 95 P 2d 833, which held that:
"In the absence of the identical person who
signed the instrument an officer cannot accept the
affidavit of a witness to the signature and then, upon
such affidavit alone, take the acknowledgment."
In the case of Myers v. Eby supra, the facts were almost
identical with the case in point in that the signature of one
of the mortgagors was affixed to the mortgage outside of
the presence of the justice of the peace who notarized the
document and the justice called the mortgagor and confirn1ed
the signature by telephone. The court in that case said:
"Where the personal presence of a party before
an officer is a requirement of the statute, an acknow1edgment of a person not in the presence of the officer,
taken by means of the telephone, is not a mere irregularity. It is beyond the power of the officer to take
an acknowledgment in this manner. The recitals in
the certificate become a mere fabrication."
See: LeMesnager, et al v. Hamilton, 101 Cal, 532,
35 Pac. 1054.
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See Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co, 5 Utah 205, 14 Pac. 338.
\vhich states:
"One object of the acknowledgment is to entitle
the deed to be recorded but the record is only the
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
certificate of acknowledgment is itself only prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. It is not
conclusive and rna y be rebutted."

POINT VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONDUCT OF
RESPONDENT IN EACH OF SAID ACTIONS RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ANY RIGHTS AS
BEING PRIOR AND SUPERIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF
APPELLANT.
The argument contained in next to last paragraph under
appellant's Point VI may also be applied and argued under
this point.
Appellant pleaded and relies upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the instant cases. From the acts and conduct
of respondent, regardless of which conclusion the court might
come to under the various contentions of respondent, respondent should be estopped from either challenging the validity
of appellant's lien or of claiming priority over same. The
instant cases are equity cases. Respondent has not come
into court with clean hands. If there was ever a case in which
this doctrine should be applied it appears that this is such
a case.
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It appears that respondent has taken a most inconsistent
position in these cases. Respondent contends for one theory
a~ against this appellant, and the opposite theory as against
the other lien claimants.
Respondent was responsible for the manner in which
construction was carried on. Grow the agent of respondent
knew during the construction of homes in the Keyridge area
that Mecham was losing money so what did Grow do, he
told Mecham to get additional properties on which to build
and that he would contract with Grow on those houses at a
higher figure than had been contracted for on the Keyridge
area. Mecham did this. Grow pursuaded Mecham to mortgage the Schauerhamer lots to respondent company and told
Mecham that respondent would finance the purchase of additional properties which could be mortgaged. The mortgage
monies from these additional properties were used at least in
part to bring houses in Grow's controlled companies areas
to a more near completion. Mecham was in debt $119,000
and the scheme was to get more property on which more
mortgages could be placed, the proceeds from which the old
bills would be paid first.
Grow as agent for respondent stood by and observed
materialmen stockpiling materials some on Keyridge property in the name of his controlled company and some on
LaMesa in the name of Mecham. He further observed the
taking of plumbing materials from each stockpile and its
being used in buildings in each area. As to this fact a
portion of the testimony given by Mecham is herein set out as
follows:
(page 612)
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Q.

Mr. Mecham, did you see Mr. Grow on and
about the areas in which you were building during
the course of construction of these buildings?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you see Mr. Grow on and about the
properties during the period of time that workmen
were working around the areas?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you see Mr. Grow on or about the
properties during the period of time when plumbing
materials were being taken from stock piles on
Keyridge and used on other projects?

A.

Yes, I am sure.

Q.

Did you see Mr. Grow in and about the LaMesa area when plumbing materials were being taken
from the stock pile on LaMesa and used in other
areas?

A.

Yes, I saw Mr. Grow on the property at

that time.

Q.

Did Mr. Grow ever request you or inquire
of you whether you were making any segregation of
materials that were going into these various areas?

A.

No, he didn't.

Q.

Did Mr. Grow ever ask you to make a segregation of materials that were going into these several
areas.

A.

No.
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It is evident that respondent was not obligated to advance mortgage monies as the trial court rightly held. Neither
did respondent advance to Mecham, the contractor, or if he
was in fact the owner, 100% of the amount of the mortgage,
nor \vere the mortgages credited with the 10% withheld by
respondent from each of the LaMesa mortgages until the
day of the opening of trial. The amount withheld by respondent and credited on the first day of trial was $32,400.00.
Had respondent been obligated to advance said sum and
had such sum been made available to Mecham during the
course of construction of houses in the four areas we have
a right to presume appellant would not have been confronted
with the mess which causes us to bring this case before the
Supreme Court.
While the mortgages foreclosed by respondent might
in law be enforceable as against Mecham, they are not such
as entitles the mortgages to priority over the lien of a ppellant.
Respondent controlled the release of the monies represented by the mortgages and directed the manner in which
payment was to be made and to whom the monies were to be
paid. Respondent, and respondent only determined which
account monies drawn by Mecham against the mortgages were
to be charged. If the properties were some Mecham's and
some respondent's or Grow's companies as respondent contends then it was the duty of respondent to have requested
that appellant segregate its accounts and to require a record
and charging out of materials which were going into those
properties owned by respondent and those properties owned
by Mecham. There is no contradition of the fact that no
records were kept by Mecham or by any of his men as
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plumbing materials were taken from each stockpile and used
in each area. Nor was Mecham ever instructed by Grow
a~ agent for respondent to keep such a record or to segregate
the accounts.
The descriptions used by appellant in its lien were
those furnished by respondent to appellant in the lien
waiver which respondent requested appellant's agents to sign
and which they refused to do. No one but an engineer could
take the descriptions furnished by respondent and find a
particular lot and point out with any degree of accuracy the
particular lot as fitting a particular description. The plat
on the LaMesa area was not filed until a time after appellant filed its lien. The Rowley property was never
platted? Nor was the Scha uerhamer property platted as
a subdivision.
The evidence conclusively shows that Mecham was
but a tool in the hands of Grow who was acting at all times
on behalf of and for respondent. It is clearly evident that
the placing of title in the name of various companies by
Grow and the method of operation and of having Mecham
take title to LaMesa and Rowley areas in his name, was all
a scheme by and through which the rights of materialmen
and creditors would be and were defeated.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case so strongly shows that because
of the acts and conduct of agents of respondent respondent
should be estopped from questioning the validity of appellant\ lien or claiming its rights as being superior to that of
appellant that the court need not concern itself, in the opinion
of appeJ Iant., with the oth('r points upon which appellant re-
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lies any one of which if the court should rule in favor of appellant will establish appellant's right to a foreclosure of
its lien and which should establish the lien as superior to
that of respondent's mortgage.
If the court however, does not apply estoppel in favor
of appellant an~ should the court not find and determine
that Mecham in fact held title to Rowley and LaMesa areas
for respondent but that Mecham was the true owner, such
determination still will not defeat the lien of appellant inasmuch as appellant was dealing at all times with Mecham,
the owner builder. Then too, such defense could not be
relied on by respondent as to the Schauerhamer area owned
by Mid-Utah Construction Co. on which area Mecham had
contracted to build for Mid-Utah.
In the Schauerhamer area appellant could not have kept
track of the way title to these properties were being juggled
around. It is evident that Mecham took title to a part of the
property in his name first, then Mid-Utah Construction
Company took title to that part of the property which had
been held in Mecham's name and which had not been sold.
Appellant was at all times dealing with Mecham the contractor.
Respondent cannot defeat the lien of appellant no matter
how bad it might be without first establishing the validity
of its mortgages, this because unless respondent can bring
itself into a class of lien claimants it has no right to question
the lien of appellant. Appellant's action to foreclose its
lien is against Mecham. It is Mecham against whom a ppellant seeks a deficiency judgment unless appellant estab-
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lishes the fact that respondent and not Mecham is the true
owner of the properties.
Section 38-l-8 UCA 1953 gives appellant the right
to lien any and all property which has received its materials under a single contract with Mecham, this is true
whether delivered to the owner or the agent of the owner,
and under section 38-l-4 UCA 1953 the properties whether
two or more lots or subdivisions is one for the purpose of
establishing appellant's lien. The contractor, materialman
relationship is the determining factor, one ownership is not
necessary.
There was no showing that anyone has been misled
by the description as contained in appellant's lien nor has
it been shown that anyone has been prejudiced as a result
of appellant's claiming all properties which received its materials under one lien. Mecham has not objected to such
procedure.
The judgment of the district court should be reversed
and the lien of appellant should be found and determined
to be valid and superior to the rights of respondent and a
foreclosure of the lien should he ordered and a sale of the
properties out of which the proceeds of the sale should be
applied equally to the lots affected by the three actions here
before the court as to that proportionate amount of the lien
affected by these actions.
Respectfully submitted,

M. V. BACKMAN of
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK,
Auorneys for Appellant.
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